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1. Introduction1 
 
As in other West-European countries Danish innovation policies has undergone significant changes 
during the past couple of decades. Moreover, it is perhaps one of the most important changes that 
innovation has gained much higher focus and priorities in the overall industrial policy. It is fair to 
say that even if the importance of technological development has been recognised since long, then 
innovation has now to a much larger extent become the buzzword of Danish industrial policies.  
 
Promoting innovation through changing institutional structures and incentives is bounded by the 
institutional and political set-up this policy is to be implemented in. In other words, the historically 
rooted Danish mode of innovation provides an important trajectory for which policies that could be 
expected to be effective and efficient.  
 
Policy changes are, however, not only a result of previous development, because this would require 
that all past political decisions were made on a completely well-informed basis in a world without 
different political interests. In practise, governments are unable to operate without failures, political 
conflicts and public debates may influence decisions, and the knowledge on the nature of the inno-
vation process has improved immensely. Furthermore, governments learn from experiences on what 
works and what fails. Likewise the scope for efficient policy is bounded by the national industrial 
structure, norms and traditions for collaboration etc. Therefore, innovation policy is a much more 
demanding task than simply copying successful schemes from abroad. As a result, political strate-
gies change over time in response to all these forces.  
 
Following the argument above, to understand the development of innovation policy it is important 
to define the context in which is to operate, in other words, the special features of Danish innova-
tion must be explained. This is done in section 2, following this introduction. The above-mentioned 
main changes in innovation policies are explained in section 3. Next, in section 4, it is discussed 
what are the present challenges for innovation policies. It is discussed what inspiration to these pol-
icies is, in particular to what extent academic research influence policy making. Measures to cope 
with these changes are exemplified in section 5. These examples are not chosen randomly but illus-
trate some important principles of policy making. Finally, section 6 summarises the main arguments 
of the paper and points to possible future policy developments. 
 
2. Characteristics of a possible Danish mode of innovation 
 
The headline of this section does, of course, exaggerate how far one can go in defining a uniform 
mode of innovation, which is characteristic for all Danish firms. In practise, firms differ in their 
objectives for innovation, in the sources of inspiration for innovation, in how radical the innovations 
are, in how benefits are appropriated etc. Nevertheless, it is possible to point to some general fea-
tures of innovation in Denmark.  
 
                                                 
1
  I am grateful to Jens Nyholm, Mikkel B. Rasmussen, Peter Torstensen and Birgit Kjølbye of The Ministry of Industry 
for their time to participate in interviews on the issues in this article. The responsibility of the content is solely with the 
author, and opinions expressed are not necessarily shared by the Ministry of Industry. 
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3 
This has been analysed in a large research project called DISKO (Danish Innovation System in 
KOmpartive perspective). The overall objective was to map the Danish innovation system and to 
enhance the understanding of the innovation processes in Danish firms
2
. This research has indeed 
inspired policy making as will be discussed later. The final report from the project (Lundvall, 1999) 
summarised the findings and put them in a broader perspective. With respect to a possible specific 
Danish mode of innovation it was pointed to, among others, the following features: 
 
Based on data on the specialisation of Danish export and production the technological development 
in Denmark may be characterised as strongly specialised in low-technology products. There are 
some high technology fields in the Danish production for example in pharmaceuticals (dominated 
by NOVO) but generally the science-based industries make up a small share of the economy.  
 
On the other hand Denmark is especially successful in the production and export of ‘low’ and ‘low 
medium’ technology goods. This includes food products, furniture and clothing. In addition, suc-
cessful niche productions have been established in a number of areas like windmills, health care 
products, seed production and environmental technologies. Some of these areas have been stimulat-
ed or even started by public regulation or/and the welfare model of Denmark. Firms are generally 
good at absorbing and using technology including information technology and process optimisation. 
Incremental product development characterises both the high technology and the low technology 
firms. 
 
In fact, there was an early recognition of the nature of the Danish technological development along 
the lines mentioned above. Thus, in a policy document from 1990 it was much emphasised as illus-
trated by the citation below (translation from Danish) 
 
“…for a country like Denmark it is of great importance, that new technology is intro-
duced in the production process. Many so-called low-tech industries have survived on 
skill-full implementation of new technology in all phases of the production process, 
and this may improve competitiveness significantly. This type of technological devel-
opment must not be under-estimated” (Industriministeriet, 1990, p.11) 
 
In spite of this recognition the same document proceeds immediately after the passage quoted above 
with arguing how vital R&D is, and the policy recommendations derived are without exception tar-
geted at enhancing R&D and the system for appropriation (ibid., p.12). This seems to be a paradox: 
it is emphasised that technological development is based on a wide range of innovative capabilities, 
not only science. Nevertheless, R&D-policies are advocated. Apparently the policy making is sub-
ject to a considerable inertia and lack of creativity. Moreover, the political will to make more tar-
geted policies were generally lacking – something which changed shortly after, as we shall see in 
the next section. 
 
Another feature of the Danish innovation system is the system for vocational and adult training. In 
Denmark this may be characterised as heavily targeted at upgrading general qualifications, at least 
the part of the training system which is publicly funded. The policy rationale is to improve labour 
market flexibility by upgrading general skills and to avoid free-rider behaviour of firms if the fi-
nancing is private. However, the qualifications in need in the new business environment is to a large 
extent abilities to co-operation, communication etc., which may be argued to be learned most effi-
                                                 
2
   See further details on the DISKO-project (1996-1999) on http://www.business.auc.dk/disko/. 
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ciently in the specific context in which the persons are expected to co-operate, that is the firm. It is 
consequently advocated by some observers that the training system should be adjusted towards a 
more firm specific model (Nyholm et al., 2001, p.264). 
 
Changes in the vocational training system in the direction of a more firm specific model were also 
called for a decade ago (Industriministeriet, 1990, p.14). Changes in this direction have been small 
and slow. One of the reasons is probably an internal fight between ministries on what their resort 
area should be. On the other hand, over time the collaboration between ministries has generally im-
proved in large as a consequence of pure necessity – innovations are increasingly complex and re-
quire different actors to take part. 
 
Still another feature of the innovation system in Denmark is a high propensity to collaborate on in-
novation. Within firms there is a growing emphasis on the interaction across departments, between 
colleagues and between management and workers. Danish manufacturing firms interact with cus-
tomers and suppliers more frequently than firms in other countries. On the other hand, the interac-
tion with universities is less developed in Denmark than abroad. To a certain degree this reflects a 
rather well functioning system of technological intermediares who communicate new technological 
insights to the firms (Christensen, Schibany, Vinding, 2001).  
 
3. Phases of innovation policies 
 
Below is provided an overview of important phases of innovation policies in the past three decades. 
In some cases it is difficult to differentiate between principles of the broader industrial policy and 
innovation policy. The overview show that policies have changed from a technology policy to an 
innovation policy and it shows that different policy principles have been the background for policies 
in different phases of time. It is subsequently discussed what are the sources of inspiration for the 
policies pursued.  
 
3.1 The development of innovation policy 
 
Before the 1970s a technology policy was hardly discussed. Only as a part of the general industrial 
policy and discussions on productivity development the technological development was mentioned 
as a policy issue. During the 1970s a specific technology policy gradually appeared although it was 
still not an important part of industrial policy. Instruments used were allowing firms tax deductions 
for R&D-expenditures, and in 1973 the Law on Technological Service was passed through parlia-
ment. This law specified an increased involvement of the Government in the financing and running 
of the technological assistance to firms. It included the establishment of a Technological Council. In 
addition to this important policy change a fund was established in 1970 (UdviklingsFondet – the 
Development Fund), which granted loans to private firms for development of their product- and 
process innovations and their R&D-expenditures. This Fund fulfilled a need in the industry and was 
administrated in a non-bureaucratic manner. It lived for an unusual long period, since it was not 
terminated before 1990. A complementary Fund was established in 1977 (Statstilskud til produk-
tudvikling – Government Subsidy to product development) to fund not only developments of new 
innovations, but also to fund improvements of existing products in small firms, thus covering more 
incremental innovations. After a decade in operation this complementary Fund was changed to-
wards supporting firms under establishment. The innovation policy in the 1970s may be character-
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ised as somewhat fragmented and based on firm specific subsidies granted on rather general criteria. 
The growing number of initiatives in the beginning of the 1970s, was to a large extent a reaction on 
the economic crises. 
 
In the beginning of the 1980s a re-orientation of industrial policies started. The policy was more 
selective rather than general. It was introduced in some policy instruments that collaboration be-
tween a firm and a partner with special knowledge is a prerequisite for a grant. Moreover, it was 
specifically mentioned in the policy formulation that socio-economic needs were a valid criterion 
for granting subsidies. In particular the Technology Council (Teknologirådet) was active in this 
policy formulation, which did meet some resistance from the Industry Associations (IndustriRådet). 
Also the government became more active in industrial policy although the role of the government 
was a both-and: on the one hand the new, liberal government, replacing the social democrats in 
1982, changed macro-economic policies, including fixed exchange-rate policies. The room for ma-
noeuvre in the economic policy was reduced, as were the available instruments. This made the gov-
ernment look for alternative instruments and to consider the possibilities of using industrial policy. 
On the other hand, the government were reluctant to be too interventionist in it’s approach.  
 
Even before the change of government a re-orientation of the design of policies began. In mid-
1980s and to some extent even a couple of years before, there was a rapid increase in the number of 
different types of subsidies. Moreover, there was a spread of business promotion on several minis-
tries. Especially Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased their share of 
industrial policy. In 1983 a policy was introduced, which focused upon programmes for stimulating 
specific generic technologies. Thus, as expenditures for technology policy increased gradually and 
only marginally, then the expenditures for this programme-policy increased steeply. Important ex-
amples include Teknologisk Udviklings Program (Technological Development Programme) from 
dec.1983, which started the development of this type of policy. It was followed by a bio-tech pro-
gramme, a programme for developing and using new materials, a programme for Food Technology 
and a programme on Strategic Research in Environmental Technologies. These programmes have 
as their main focus to stimulate R&D in selected areas
3
. For example, TUP focused in particular on 
IT.  
 
This new programme-policy also introduced the incorporation of a wider array of actors in the poli-
cy implementation process. Traditionally IndustriRådet and Håndværksrådet (two major industry 
associations) have had an important say in the formulation and implementation of policy. However, 
they were only marginally included. In stead, the Association of Electronics Manufacturers was an 
important player in the TUP-programme.  
 
The new programme-policy was inspired by and resembles those of other countries. For example, 
programmes in Sweden and the UK on stimulating IT was much alike the Danish TUP-programme. 
However, the Danish programme took into account a Danish mode of innovation in that it empha-
sised more the diffusion of technology rather than development of basic technologies. It was also 
broader in its target industries as it aimed at stimulating the use of IT in traditional industries as 
well
4
. 
                                                 
3
  These programmes were supplemented with a number of other programmes of less R&D-orientation.  
4
  One could add that the Danish economy in some manufacturing areas is ill-suited for public procurement policies 
compared to other countries. Especially Denmark has no strong military complex and not a strong aircraft or space 
technology industry either. On the other hand a strong and advanced service sector is an advantage in the public pro-
curement policy.  
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After 1989 and a considerable number of years in the 1990s there was a reduction in the number of 
subsidies (which exceeded 40 and were beginning to be complicated for the users). In the beginning 
of 1990s there was even a decrease in the amount spent on industrial and technology policy initia-
tives. A re-orientation had taken place where research policy gained higher priority relative to in-
dustrial policy. This change in policy was inspired by discussions abroad on the inexpedient effects 
of selective policies be they of the picking the winner or supporting the loser type.  
  
In 1992 it was stated that programme policies would be continued (Industriministeriet, 1992, p.41). 
However, it was realised soon afterwards, that a re-orientation of policies was needed. Rather than 
one-sided stimulating the supply-side a different perspective was called for, recognising that a top-
down guiding of technological development was useless. Previously, during the phase of pro-
gramme policy, there was a widespread believe that technological development could be pushed in 
a top-down planned manner. This perception was abandoned with the shift of policies towards 
framework conditions. On the initiative of The Danish Business Development Council (EUR) a 
number of studies were conducted using an approach which resembles that of earlier Porter-studies 
and similar studies using a cluster approach.  
 
These studies were denoted resource area studies meaning studies of not only private firms in a sec-
tor or an aggregation of traditional sectors, but rather an array of different firms, public and private 
knowledge institutions, suppliers etc. The common denominator defining the resource area is to a 
large extent the demand for the end product
5
. Moreover, the resource areas are defined as sharing 
roughly the same factor conditions. The latter point is important, because it means that policies may 
be targeted towards these areas rather than the traditional statistical aggregation of industries or – as 
in the programme policies – towards stimulating the generic technologies.  
 
In addition to studies of these areas cross-sectional studies were undertaken. Together these formed 
the basis for a policy development process. As a follow-up on the analyses it was decided to estab-
lish a forum for dialog with representatives from each of the clusters with the purpose of detecting 
special framework conditions and needs for targeted policies. A reference group consequently mon-
itors each single resource area with representatives from firms, organisations and relevant minis-
tries. Discussions in these groups and ad-hoc working sub-groups help policy makers to identify 
critical framework conditions and possibilities to improve these. Results of these processes are 
greater cross-ministerial co-ordination as the resource areas are defined in a broader way than tradi-
tional industries and because the framework conditions often involves resorts of Ministry of Educa-
tion, Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Research
6
.  
 
Furthermore there are concrete results of these processes in the form of policy initiatives. In an ear-
ly 1997 report (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 1997) on the status of the outcome of the process it was 
found, that 29 ad-hoc working groups have been established, 513 different people from a wide spec-
trum of organisations, ministries etc. have been involved, 152 policy suggestions (both suggestions 
to completely new initiatives, changes in existing legislation, changes in administration, changes in 
priorities in fiscal budgets) were developed, of which 66 were actually implemented.  
                                                 
5
  Examples include Food, Construction and Housing, Medico/Health. See Drejer et al. (1998) and 
www.ressourceomraader.dk for a further description of the resource areas in Denmark.  
6
  In 1993 The Ministy of Industrial Policy Coordination was established. Even the name signalled a broader approach 
to industrial policy but it also meant a real policy change.  
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When the Ministry, together with other ministries, in 1996 became engaged in analyses and discus-
sions on the broader aspects of innovation – especially in relation to the work in “Velfærdskommis-
sionen” (Welfare Commission) – focus was extended to especially the intertwined effects of organi-
sational and technological change and to the importance of development of human resources. Re-
cent surveys show consistently that the role of human resources is still more important for the abil-
ity of firms to innovate.  
 
Recently another dialog was established between representatives from the businesses and The Min-
istry of Industry. This was initiated as a response of warnings from industry that long-run competi-
tiveness of businesses were in danger. This was argued to have resulted in a decline in exports 
(which later showed to be a minor downswing in a long period of increased exports) and should 
make the Government react, it was argued. As a consequence, a forum for dialogue was established, 
Industriens Udviklingsgruppe (Industrial Development Group), with representatives from large 
businesses and The Ministry of Industry. The purpose was to discuss how long-run competitiveness 
and productivity growth could be ensured.  
 
Although it may be possible to identify such phases of policy, then changes are primarily gradual 
and some particular instruments are prevailing in more than one period. Moreover, although there 
may be a certain policy strategy, then the actual implementation process of the policy may consid-
erably modify the original idea. 
 
3.2. Inspiration for recent changes in innovation policies 
 
The sources of inspiration for policy development are naturally a multiple of different types of 
sources.  
 
The examples above show that inspiration to innovation policy may be spurred by a downswing, 
which is what traditional, Keynesian policy principles, should advocate - in recessions a need for 
active industrial policy arises. However, the shift is now not to support the loser, rather to develop 
national champions and to let policies follow technological waves rather than economic fluctua-
tions. 
 
It is also clear from the examples above that the Danish policy makers have emphasised a direct 
dialog with the businesses, organisations and even single persons with ideas for policy improve-
ments. This direct dialog is supplemented with various reference groups, which have representatives 
from industry, either directly from single firms or indirectly from organisations. This dialog be-
tween policy makers and business has persisted in Danish innovation policy for a decade.  
 
Throughout this decade there has also been a dialog with academics, and policy makers within The 
Ministry of Industry have been active in learning what are innovation policy relevant implications 
of developments in economic theory. Civil servants of Ministry of Industry persistently have kept 
direct contact to academia with the purpose of learning about new developments in the understand-
ing of innovation. There is, however, still room for further development of ways of communication 
between academia and policy makers as emphasised by Nyholm et al. (2001, p.270). 
 
Indeed, research in innovation has inspired innovation policy making in Denmark. This goes for 
various research projects of applied nature. Also policy makers have referred to general develop-
Danish Innovation policy,   Jesper Lindgaard Christensen 
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ment of economic theory when arguing for changes in innovation policy. In particular, advances in 
the system approach to innovation and the evolutionary theory has contributed to a change in the 
way innovation policy is argued. Some of the policy initiatives and some of the overall formulations 
of government policies may be characterised as a systems approach. Moreover, the vocabulary is 
close to what is used in the literature on systems approach to innovation policy. However, when it 
comes to practical policy it is more ad-hoc based rather than integrated in an overall strategy. Fur-
thermore, most often the causality is that policy initiatives are decided and arguments for the policy 
are subsequently found in the literature on innovation and the new economy. The traditional market 
failure perspective as a rationale for policy making has now been abandoned, at least in The Minis-
try of Industry
7
. In stead, focus is upon the coherence of the innovation system.  
 
The direct contact is complemented with the indirect influence of academia stemming from mainly 
two sources. First, the content of the education as an economist has changed towards more empha-
sis on introduction of modern innovation theory. At most universities the students are also intro-
duced to industrial policy, including even innovation policy. Subsequently this means greater 
awareness of innovation theory when these economists eventually become employed in the central 
administration. This is probably the most important source of long-run change in policy thinking. 
Secondly, Danish Ministries have used consultants to undertake large evaluations and similar anal-
yses, but it is usually required that the consultants incorporate leading academics either in reference 
groups or directly in parts of the work. This is an important way of encapturing in a practical setting 
the insights from developments of economic theory. The evaluations are, of course, themselves an 
instrument for policy learning, although they are often not used efficiently as such. 
 
Internally, the Ministry of Industry not only keeps contact to academia but also deliberately upgrade 
academic skills of policy makers. Thus, civil servants are encouraged to read and write academic 
papers, and to attend conferences. In the recruitment it is viewed an asset if you have an academic 
career in advance. Furthermore, an internal Center for Research in Industrial Policy (Center for 
Erhvervspolitisk Forskning) has been established as well as other similar units for applied research 
on issues relevant for industrial policy.  
 
One strategy for policy learning within this field is to increase exchange of cross-country experi-
ences. This is already taking place at the level of national civil servants studying innovation policy 
in other countries. However, the processes are fragmented and to some extend constrained by e.g. 
language differences. The process could benefit from studies of systematic, research-based founda-
tions. In the Danish Ministry of Industry it is currently being considered how a systematic monitor-
ing of policies in other countries should be organised. 
 
Recent changes in policy are also driven by internal budget constraints. The political system is re-
luctant to approve permanent expenditures for industrial policy. Therefore, the general change in 
policy is towards developing more flexible, temporare policy instruments. We shall later get back to 
this point.  
 
                                                 
7
  The market failure argument seems to persist in some ministries like The Ministry of Finance and The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. 
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4. Challenges for policy posed by the development of the business envi-
ronment 
 
The above mentioned increased complexity of innovation is probably one of the most important 
changes in the way the innovation process is perceived. The increased complexity has several di-
mensions. Firstly, the focus is now not only on new products and new processes. To an increasing 
extent it has been recognised that new forms of organisations, augmented services in relation to 
manufacturing, and development of new after-innovation methods are crucial for economic perfor-
mance. The way policy makers think about innovation is now broadening from a focus upon manu-
facturing industry towards innovation in services also.  
 
This is reflected in the intensity and in the way firms collaborate on innovation. Firms tend to inno-
vate in collaboration with other firms and with a broad set of institutions. Moreover, innovations 
often relate to not only one specific knowledge base. A new food product may for example involve 
basic knowledge from biotechnology (genetic engineering), chemicals, logistic processes and con-
servation/packaging. Likewise the ability to innovate is increasingly dependent upon different types 
of institutions outside research like labour market institutions, education etc
8
. This constitutes a 
challenge for policy-making, as it requires collaboration between policy makers from different min-
istries. Often this is not only a clash of different fields of competencies but also of different cultures 
and approaches to policy making. Despite the fact that innovation policy in Denmark is viewed in a 
more holistic manner compared to many other countries
9
, and there is increased collaboration be-
tween ministries there is still a relatively sharp resort-dependent division of policy areas. This is 
seen a major barrier for a multi-disciplinary innovation policy. To make it even more complicated 
the rate and mode of innovation in a nation has been said to be dependent upon social capital, which 
may be difficult to stimulate by way of traditional innovation policy.  
 
Secondly, innovation is not necessarily based upon glamorous, radical new inventions. A wide 
range of different firms in different industries innovates, although often in an incremental way. In-
cremental innovations are often embedded in a firm specific setting, and are based upon tacit 
knowledge. Tacit knowledge, in turn, is not easily transferable as opposed to the increased flows of 
codified knowledge. At the same time tacit knowledge becomes still more important. This is also a 
challenge to innovation policy as it highlights the importance of the regional dimension of policy 
making. In spite of increasing internationalisation, innovation policy is still important in a national 
and even regional context (Lundvall & Borras, 1997).  
 
Thirdly, the above mentioned increased tendency to collaborate on innovation makes policies to 
stimulate collaboration even more central in the future (this is exemplified later). In many countries 
special attention is paid to stimulating knowledge transfer from knowledge institutions to private 
firms. In Denmark, as well as in many other countries, the re-orientation of innovation policy has 
meant a movement from firm-specific subsidies to supporting institutions collaborating with firms. 
 
Fourthly, the development is characterised by turbulent, fast changes, which in itself makes innova-
tion policy more difficult. This makes it more necessary to closely monitor the development and to 
                                                 
8
  Recently The Ministry has attempted to integrate industrial policy with the development of culture. This is reflected 
in a joint publication from The Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Culture in which it is argued that there is a strong 
link between industrial development and culture (Erhvervs- og Kulturministeriet, 2000). 
9
  This is reflected in the strategy for industrial policy published in 2000 (Regeringen 2000a and 2000b). 
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develop flexible, temporary policy instruments. For example, the Danish government has imple-
mented a monitoring exercise, where key indicators on innovation etc. are benchmarked against 
other countries. Furthermore, the Government has decided to implement during 2001-2003 an ac-
count on national competence development (Regeringen, 2000, p. 24). Official statistical data are, 
however, often rather old when they are released, and often the data are not focused upon indicators 
reflecting the new economy. Therefore, dialog with leading-edge firms and knowledge institutions 
is essential. With respect to flexibility the ambition with development of policy is to a greater extent 
use a temporarily stimulation of market forces by providing incentives to make the markets func-
tion, then pull out of the market.  
 
Fifthly, as information is generally available, and as all countries try to set up the best possible gen-
eral framework conditions, the critical success factor increasingly becomes to develop specific 
framework conditions, which may be useful for only a segment of the market and which may be 
more “soft” factors. 
 
Finally, the systems approach to innovation policy advocates focus upon the coherence of the sys-
tem and the ability of institutions to upgrade the learning capacity of firms. However, in order for 
this policy to be successful, it is a prerequisite that competencies of consultants, of investors in new 
firms, of potential entrepreneurs and managers are sufficient to render a fruitful collaboration. In 
other words, the absorptive ability of firms to incorporate new knowledge is dependent upon the 
competence of the parties. Therefore, a general increase of competencies will make innovation poli-
cy more efficient. This is, however, a difficult policy area, and considerable creativity in policy 
making is called for. One response on this challenge is the Danish LOK-programme 
(LOK=Management, Organisation and Competence)
10
, which was heavily inspired by academic 
research in the Danish innovation system. 
 
5. Selected examples of innovation policies – principles for policy mak-
ing 
 
 
5.1. Policies aimed at improving the risk capital market 
 
It is obvious that availability of capital is only part of a well-functioning national innovation sys-
tem. It is, however, an important part and it has been claimed that financial institutions to a large 
extent is the glue in national innovation systems as they bind together different types of agents in 
the NIS and are the selection mechanisms of business opportunities. Likewise it is important to have 
a wide range of adequate institutions within the financial system to perform this selection in a com-
petent manner. 
 
A number of government initiatives have aimed to fill in what is perceived as gaps in the financing 
of firms
11
. The intention behind the design of these initiatives is that they should each contribute to 
the improvement of access to capital in different stages of the development of a firm. 
                                                 
10
  See further details on this programme in Lundvall & Borras (1997, p.98) or http://www.lok-initiativer.dk/ 
11
 Among initiatives taken in recent years the following should be mentioned: a guarantee scheme for selected venture 
capital companies, a fund “Danish Business Development Finance”, a Loan Guarantee Scheme, a specialised institute to 
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Government initiatives and the private market driven development have no doubt contributed to a 
narrowing of the financing gap mentioned earlier. There are further plans or already taken actions 
within the government to improve access to finance including establishment of a business angels 
network and changes in the legislative regulation of investments from pension funds. 
 
In general, broadly all initiatives are inspired from similar schemes in other countries. A similar 
approach is taken in other countries as well: inspiration to policy formulation on risk capital comes 
to a large extent from abroad
12
, but also through dialogue with suppliers of capital and with aca-
demics. Interestingly, ideas within this area have a considerable entry time. For example, a business 
angel network was proposed in 1992 (Koppel, 1992), a loan guarantee scheme in 1992 (Christen-
sen, 1992), mezzanine capital in 1992 (Christensen 1992). This is not to say that it was unwise to 
not implement these schemes earlier. Rather, it shows two things. It shows that the policy process is 
a balance between interests – in this case the agents on the market have been very conservative and 
reluctant towards changes that are not purely market driven. And it shows that the timing of gov-
ernment initiatives is crucial. What may be politically feasible and work in practise in one period 
may be functioning very differently in another period of time. The market may in many cases need 
certain maturity before private agents adopt policy initiatives. 
 
The above target of policies illustrates two of the general policy principles derived from this case. 
First, innovation policy is most often targeted towards a specific segment of the industry rather than 
general, macro policies. It is a very clear picture from government programmes that they are pri-
marily targeted towards the seed- or early stage segment. Secondly, the need for policy intervention 
is as dynamic as the development of the business environment. Therefore, the need for innovation 
policy depends upon the business cycle and the structural development in general. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of innovation policy may be dependent upon the timing and structural development. In 
addition to these two principles we may add a third principle, which has guided policy in particular 
in the risk capital market area but increasingly also other policy areas: the strategy of the policy 
intervention is to either give the private market forces a spark, then pull out as soon as the private 
agents have established a sustainable market. The strategy may also be to subsidise costs associated 
with learning to operate in a segment of the market where learning costs prevent private agents to 
operate profitable. The very early, seed funding of entrepreneurial businesses is one such market. In 
pursuing this strategy it is recognised that direct government participation may in some cases lead 
to government failure: even if the private market is not capable to solve a certain problem, then 
there is no guarantee that the government is any better. Therefore, the strategy for policy is to build 
upon competencies already existing in the market. In some cases, however, there is no argument 
why government intervention should not be equally, or more, efficient than private agents. 
 
 
5.2 Policies to stimulate collaboration on innovation 
 
The importance of collaboration, co-operation and networking (ccn) in innovation has been much 
emphasised in recent economic thinking as well as in empirical work on innovation. Since long it 
                                                                                                                                                                  
provide Mezzanine capital, Tax changes, Establishment of 6 business incubators. See more on these initiatives in Chris-
tensen (2000a). 
12
  See a review of government initiatives to stimulate venture capital in OECD countries in Financial Market Trends, 
no. 63. 
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has been recognised that firms rely heavily upon external partners in innovation activities. Howev-
er, it is now widely believed that recent changes in the economy as a whole and more specifically in 
the way innovations are undertaken, has meant an enhanced role for ccn in innovation as was also 
pointed out in section 3. It is reasonable to expect this trend to continue and be reinforced in the 
future. The arguments for this are several. It should here only be pointed to the fact that production 
is increasingly dependent upon knowledge, but not just any knowledge. Economists and sociolo-
gists alike have come to the agreement that tacit knowledge is becoming still more important. This 
is in turn caused partly by the wide, easy access to information in general. When everybody have 
access to codified knowledge, then a leading edge in the competition must depend upon a unique 
knowledge not as easily accessible by others; it must depend on tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge 
is, however, rarely produced in isolation and it is above all transferred in an interaction with the 
user of this information. Therefore, collaboration on developing and transferring useful knowledge 
for innovation is likely to increase. 
 
Given the fact that ccn is key in tomorrows industrial development, it becomes interesting to know 
how ccn is stimulated. In other words, this becomes a major policy issue. Following the argument 
above an example on Danish policies targeted at stimulating ccn is presented. The case, Center-
kontrakter (Centre Contracts) is a scheme designed to enhance collaboration between universities, 
semi-public research institutions and industry. All three types of parties must take part and it is ex-
plicitly formulated that long-term competence building and innovation is one of the major objec-
tives. This scheme may be seen as giving incentives to backward linking with knowledge institu-
tions and it is heavily oriented towards development of relatively radical innovations. This scheme 
is seen as an important new instrument in Danish innovation policy. 
 
As was discussed earlier, it has been a general trend in Danish innovation policy to turn focus away 
from single, isolated elements of the conditions for innovation, and in stead enhancing the coher-
ence of the different elements in the innovation system. The Centrecontract-scheme is an important 
example on such policies as it gives incentives to bring together key actors in the system. Thus, the 
objective of the Centrecontract-scheme is to intensify the corporation between universities, private 
companies and the Authorised technological service institutes.  
 
The Centrecontract-scheme was introduced in 1995 and is basically a government co-financing of 
the costs of Authorised Technological Service Institutes (up to 75%) and research institutions (up to 
100%) in participating in a strategic collaboration with private firms on process or product devel-
opment.  
 
The Authorised Technological Service Institutes are not only the key ccn-partner and driving force 
behind establishment of the majority of Centre contracts, but also important intermediaries in the 
general knowledge transfer in the economy. Generally the intermediares are important institutions 
in Danish innovation system. 
 
The aim with the scheme is that the specific impact should be three-fold: First, an (expected) effect 
on innovation. Second, the aim with the scheme is to increase competencies, especially in the GTS-
institutes. The third effect expected from the scheme is a pure network effect. It is explicitly formu-
lated that the scheme is intended to stimulate networking among the partners not only during the 
centre contract but also on a longer term. One of the sub-objectives of the programme is to transfer 
tacit knowledge. 
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Generally the scheme is an adequate measure for bridging different elements in the innovation- and 
knowledge system. It is often a problem to ensure productive collaboration between different types 
of partners because they have different incentives
13
. Evaluations have shown that the centre-
contract scheme is an effective means of ensuring incentive compatibility and facilitating the trans-
fer of knowledge between different parts of the innovation system. The success of this instrument 
has meant a tendency to over-use it on many policy problems. 
 
The above policy example show that ccn-policy has high priority in Danish innovation policy. The 
Danish firms tend to collaborate relatively often when developing new products although (due to 
the institutional structure of the innovation system) not as often directly with universities. Probably, 
this over-average propensity to collaborate is rooted in a historical tradition for informal, trust-based 
collaboration, perhaps even stemming back to the co-operative movement in the beginning of 20
th
 
century. An additional explanation is the tradition for corporatism on the labour market.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper outlined different phases of Danish innovation policies. Although changes have been 
gradual there were a clear movement from firm-specific subsidies to programme policy and subse-
quently to gearing framework conditions for targeted areas of industry. In recent years the system 
approach to innovation policy has been important. Innovation policies now emphasise the coher-
ence of the system, knowledge flows, competence building and ccn. 
 
The inspiration for this change of policy has come from a multiple of sources. The policy formula-
tion has been inspired by a combination of foreign programmes, single private firms, organisations 
and academia. Both international and domestic sources of inspiration for policy change have been 
important. Thus, the OECD has on some points inspired policy making as has both the general poli-
cy strategies of other countries as well as specific programmes. To some extent economic theory 
and researchers in other countries have inspired policy making, but probably the domestic sources 
are more predominant in Denmark than in other countries, even if Denmark is a small country. 
 
Moreover, the development of the business environment has meant a dynamic pressure on the inno-
vation policy formulation. Specifically, increased complexity and speed of the innovation process 
has challenged policy formulation. In addition, a broader perception of what is innovation and an 
increased collaboration between different actors makes innovation much broader than hitherto per-
ceived. This means in turn involvement of a wider range of policy actors.  
 
Reactions to these trends are necessary because the need for policy intervention is as dynamic as the 
development of the business environment. Therefore, the need for innovation policy depends upon 
the business cycle and the structural development in general. There are several policy changes as 
response to these challenges. One strategy of policy intervention is to support the private market 
forces for a period of time, then pull out as soon as the private agents have established a sustainable 
market. This is at the same time a means of having flexible instruments and a way of avoiding ne-
gotiating for permanent expenditures, which the political system is reluctant to approve. Among the 
policy principles is also to bind together different elements of the innovation system. This involves 
a high priority to ccn-policies as a means of diffusing knowledge in the innovation system. An im-
                                                 
13
  These differences are well described in the literature on university-industry collaboration. 
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portant element in the strategy to increase knowledge flows is to upgrade competencies through 
interactive learning. With respect to policy learning the direct dialogue with leading edge firms is 
important, as is the monitoring of the development. 
 
Recent discussion on Danish innovation policy takes into account the distinction between tacit and 
codified knowledge as part of developing special framework conditions and selective policies. This 
debate is inspired by the cluster thinking which has since long been a tradition in Danish innovation 
policy
14
. Competence building in regional
15
 agglomerations is seen as still more important in future 
industrial development.  
 
 
                                                 
14
  In the 1980s a number of studies analysed complexes in the Danish economy such as the agro-food complex. 
15
  In fact a rather small share of industrial policy in Denmark is regional. 
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